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Abstract
Android adopted SELinux’s mandatory access control
(MAC) mechanisms in 2013. Since then, billions of An-
droid devices have benefited from mandatory access control
security policies. These policies are expressed in a variety
of rules, maintained by Google and extended by Android
OEMs. Over the years, the rules have grown to be quite
complex, making it challenging to properly understand or
configure these policies.
In this paper, we perform a measurement study on the
SEAndroid repository to understand the evolution of these
policies. We propose a new metric to measure the com-
plexity of the policy by expanding policy rules, with their
abstraction features such as macros and groups, into primi-
tive “boxes”, which we then use to show that the complex-
ity of the SEAndroid policies has been growing exponen-
tially over time. By analyzing the Git commits, snapshot
by snapshot, we are also able to analyze the “age” of policy
rules, the trend of changes, and the contributor composi-
tion. We also look at hallmark events in Android’s history,
such as the “Stagefright” vulnerability in Android’s media
facilities, pointing out how these events led to changes in
the MAC policies. The growing complexity of Android’s
mandatory policies suggests that we will eventually hit the
limits of our ability to understand these policies, requiring
new tools and techniques.
1 Introduction
Smartphones are a primary target of malicious at-
tacks [21]. The Android system—as it holds the largest
share of the mobile OS market—has unfortunately become
a prominent attack target as well [19]. Over the years, many
attacks have been reported, such as Stagefright [52], Blue-
borne [3], and Toaster [34], each of which has led to signifi-
cant security concern. In order to harden Android against
such threats, researchers and developers have adapted a
wide variety of security mechanisms to the Android envi-
ronment, including process separation, finer grained access
control, and secure booting / remote attestation. This study
focuses on one such mechanism: SEAndroid [43].
As an extension of SELinux [29], SEAndroid was orig-
inally introduced by the NSA in 2013. It performs manda-
tory access control (MAC) to enforce security policies, reg-
ulating whether a particular subject (e.g., a process) can per-
form a certain action (e.g., read/write) on an object (e.g., a
file/socket). It achieves this by referring to a pre-installed
security policy with a set of access control rules, which are
compiled into a database and loaded by the kernel at boot
time.
As with SELinux, configuring a SEAndroid policy is not
an easy task [16, 41]. It is often far from obvious to reason
about whether a particular set of rules achieve a desired pol-
icy, or even to understand what policy certain rules try to im-
plement. There are several reasons for this. First, the policy
language allows many abstraction features, such as groups,
attributions, and (nested) macros, which make it challeng-
ing to infer the scope of individual rules. Second, the policy
rules have little accompanying documentation. Moreover,
they evolve significantly every year.
Fortunately, Google’s default SEAndroid policy is main-
tained in a Git repository [1] as part of the Android Open
Source Project (AOSP) [12]. The Git history provides
us with a detailed chronicle of all changes to the policy
rules, as well as the commit messages associated with each
change, totaling more than 13,000 commits over SEAn-
droid’s history. These commits serve as a rich source of
information for us to perform an historical analysis of the
policy’s evolution, snapshot by snapshot.
Performing this analysis involves at least two challenges.
First, we need a good metric to quantify the complexity of
a particular policy snapshot. Simply counting the number
of rules in a snapshot is not enough, because the SEAn-
droid policy language supports a variety of abstractions and
grouping concepts, making a rule count less useful. We
address this challenge by designing a new metric, boxes.
This metric views all possible access control policy rules as
forming a four-dimension space, with the axes being sub-
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ject, object, class, and permission. Each point in this space
is called a box, representing a smallest “unit” in the rule
space. By analyzing how many rules touch the same box,
and how many boxes are impacted by any given rule, we can
then quantify the policy’s complexity. Consider that com-
plex rules may touch many boxes and many of those boxes
may be impacted simultaneously by multiple rules. This
means that a change to any one rule may or may not result
in a change to the resulting security policy! If an engineer
truly desires to change a given box, it becomes necessary to
go hunting for every possible rule that might overlap with
it.
Our second challenge is that there are thousands of Git
commits that impact the SEAndroid policies. We use a com-
bination of approaches to address this. We have designed
and implemented an automated system that collects and an-
alyzes each Git commit, identifying “jump points” in com-
plexity both in terms of the number of rules and the number
of boxes. For significant jump points, we also manually in-
spect the commit messages associated with these commits,
and perform a differential analysis on the rules before and
after each such commit to understand the rationale of the
changes. Furthermore, we use the timestamp information
to “match” the commits with historical events of Android
security, and analyze how these events are reflected in the
policy’s evolution.
Using the above metrics and methodology, we have per-
formed an historical analysis on the SEAndroid policy’s
evolution. We focus on the development of security metrics
that we can derive from these policies, such as the number
of boxes and rules, the evolving list of types and macros, the
different authors contributing to the policy over time, how
SEAndroid policy stabilized over time, as well as the hall-
mark events in Android history. Based on these measure-
ment results, we also provide insights into how SEAndroid
might evolve to become simpler and more useful.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After describ-
ing more background material in Section 2, we introduce
our measurement methodology in Section 3, present mea-
surement results in Sections 4 and 5. Then, we discuss sev-
eral related topics in Section 6, present related work in Sec-
tion 7, and conclude in Section 8.
2 Background
In this section, we present more background material on
Android security architecture and, in particular, SEAndroid.
2.1 Android security architecture
Figure 1 shows the multiple layers of security mecha-
nisms Android uses to protect system resources and user
data [7].
Install-time permissions. Every Android application
includes a “manifest” file specifying the app’s desired per-
missions. Prior to Android 6.0, the user was queried at
install-time whether the desired permissions were accept-
able (i.e., all-or-nothing). After this, the new app is assigned
a distinct Unix “user” ID, allowing traditional Unix-style
file permissions to separate the storage for each app. How-
ever, Android includes a variety of system services, speak-
ing over Binder (an interprocess communication channel
mediated by the OS kernel). Each Binder service is re-
sponsible for determining if its caller is permitted to use it,
querying a central database constructed from those install-
time permissions. This resulted in permission checks oc-
curring all over the Android software base, in both Java and
native code. This, in turn, made it a challenging research
project just to produce a mapping from every Android API
call to its corresponding set of required permissions [8].
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Figure 1. The Android security architecture.
Time-of-use permissions. As of Android 6.0, Android
apps still declare their permission requirements in the man-
ifest, but those permissions are not granted until the app ex-
plicitly requests them from the user, preferably at time-of-
use. Users are free to deny permissions and even to revoke
permissions later on from the system settings. The underly-
ing enforcement of these permissions is largely the same as
before, with individual Android services querying whether
their caller has a necessary permission.
Classic Unix discretionary (DAC) permissions. Of
course, Android is also just another flavor of Unix. If an
application directly accesses a Unix resource such as a file
or device, traditional Unix user and group IDs manage the
security. A Unix group ID is preassigned to each permis-
sion, and the Android application launcher assigns all the
necessary group IDs to the application process when it is
launched. Since a Linux process can possesses multiple
group IDs, the access will be granted or denied appropri-
ately.
SEAndroid mandatory (MAC) permissions. After
the user ID and group ID checks are performed, SEAn-
droid [43], which is an extension of SELinux [29] for An-
droid, can additionally check all system calls against its own
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Figure 2. Control flow with the Android loca-
tion API. Seven permission checks are high-
lighted with yellow circles.
policy. This policy is loaded at boot time and enforced in-
side the OS kernel. SEAndroid policies, by their static na-
ture, cannot be changed at runtime to reflect new applica-
tions and user-expressed permissions. They can, however,
be used to isolate system services, file directories, and even
Binder resources.
2.2 Example: Location services
To show how these different security systems interact,
Figure 2 diagrams the control flow involved when an app
makes a call to the Location Services, which manages the
GPS device and other location-related (and thus, privacy-
sensitive) features.
If an application calls a location API 1 , the correspond-
ing library establishes a Binder channel between the ap-
plication and the location manager 2 . Since Binder is
an IPC mechanism provided by the kernel, the client re-
quires a corresponding discretionary access control (DAC)
permission which is always allowed. After that, a SELinux
hook is called to check the SEAndroid permission, which
is also configured to always permit this call. Binder trans-
fers the request to the location manager 3 , which then
calls a checkPermission() system API (shown as “permis-
sion check”) which checks if the user granted the relevant
location permissions to the calling app. If granted, the lo-
cation manager interacts directly with the GPS device 4 .
However, this access also requires DAC and SEAndroid en-
forcement, which are configured so no other subject in the
Android universe is permitted to interact directly with the
device. The API response unwinds the call path 5 - 8 .
Each step includes another opportunity for DAC and SEAn-
droid permissions to be checked, but these are all permitted
by default.
Even in this simple example, there are seven different
access control enforcement opportunities on the path from
the app to the GPS device driver. In this case, DAC and
SEAndroid only serve to ensure that the GPS device is only
reachable from the location manager service, while the per-
mission checking for the app is handled internally by the
location manager. As this example illustrates, Android se-
curity enforcement is complex to analyze.
Here, the value of SEAndroid is to protect system re-
sources more precisely from low-level attacks. But as we
see in Figures 1 and 2, the SEAndroid policy does not have
any relationship to the Android security model as Android
users and app programmers understand it. In addition, there
is no formal documentation specifying any of the SEAn-
droid policies, much less how they interact and how the
user-visible permissions or Unix discretionary permissions
are meant to interact with each other and with SEAndroid.
2.3 SEAndroid policy rules
The SEAndroid policy engine was present on Android
devices since the early 2010s, but it was configured in
an inactive “permissive mode”. The policy was initially
configured by NSA and committed to the AOSP reposi-
tory [1]. Any Android device OEM can add their own pol-
icy along with the original policy, e.g., using tools such as
setools [45] and audit2allow [35]. This is typically
done by examining denial logs and adding additional rules,
which can then be submitted as patches for inclusion in fu-
ture ASOP releases.
To enforce the policy, the rules are then parsed and com-
piled by a compiler called checkpolicy and loaded in
the kernel at boot time. Needless to say, configuring a SE-
Android policy is critical, but at the same time, not an easy
task [42, 41]. A misconfigured policy will lead to misbehav-
iors or even security vulnerabilities. In order to understand
the complexity of the policy, we need to first understand
what the rules look like.
Allow rules. The majority of the policy consists of a
sequence of “allow rules”, such as allow appdomain
zygote tmpfs:file read, which states that any
subject of the type appdomain (i.e., all applications)
should be granted access to any file object of the type
zygote tmpfs (i.e., files that the zygote process cre-
ated in the tmp file system). Besides file, typical classes
also include directory, socket, process, and so on, each in-
dicating a particular category of resources. This rule addi-
tionally specifies a read permission, meaning that accesses
can only happen via the read system call. As we can see,
such rules allow for very fine-grained policy, but writing a
rule for each subject and object/class pair for every system
call would not scale.
Abstraction features. To avoid the policy size
from growing out of control, the SEAndroid/SELinux
policy language supports a number of abstraction fea-
tures, such as wildcards, groups, negation, and com-
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plements. A wildcard (*) can be used in any ob-
ject, class, or permission fields to represent “any possi-
ble entity”. For instance, a rule allow appdomain
zygote tmpfs:file * would allow any system call,
not just read. One could additionally group sev-
eral entities together, such as allow appdomain
zygote tmpfs: file dir *. The complement
feature is indicated using a tilde (∼), such as allow init
fs type:filesystem ∼relabelto, meaning that
any system call but a relabelto is permitted.
Neverallow rules. “Neverallow” rules works as asser-
tions for debugging. If such a rule overlaps with an al-
low rule, the policy compilation would report an error.
These rules have a similar format with allow rules, such as
neverallow domain init:binder call.
2.4 The complexity of SEAndroid policy
Over the years, the SEAndroid policy has grown to be
very complex. For instance, the snapshot as of July 2017
specifies 91 classes and 1,603 permissions. In addition to
this, three more factors exacerbate the complexity.
First, the use of abstraction features only hide the com-
plexity but does not eliminate it. For instance, allow
untrusted app self:file * may be easier to read,
but the wildcard also provides an opportunity to sweep im-
portant issues under the table. Similar to abstraction fea-
tures, SELinux supports DTE [4], which allows a domain
to be associated with multiple types. This significantly de-
creases the number of rules, but again, hides complexity and
potential vulnerability.
Second, the existence of neverallow rules itself hints at
the complexity of the policy. In fact, SEAndroid is by na-
ture a mandatory access control mechanism, which means
that the default action for anything is already “disallow”,
unless explicitly granted access by an allow rule. Providing
such assertion tool for policy configuration of a mandatory
access control mechanism implies that there is concern for
debuggability and for accidentally allowing too many ac-
tions.
Third, the policy engineering practice is at times idiosyn-
cratic. One common practice of developers, for instance, is
to extract denial messages from the kernel log using tools
like audit2allow and simply create a new policy to al-
low them. Security concerns aside, this tends to create un-
optimized, messy policy rules.
The combination of the above factors mean that it be-
comes difficult for an analyst to read the rules and under-
stand exactly what a given local change might entail in the
final calculus of what is allowed and what is denied. Such
complexity, in fact, is one of the motivating factors for us to
perform this analysis.
3 Methodologies
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to per-
form an historical analysis of the SEAndroid policy. This is
in contrast to previous work, such as Wang et al. [50] that
use machine learning to improve the policy, and Zanin et
al. [51] that use formal methods to verify policy correctness.
Our goal is to understand not only the most recent snapshot,
but also how the policy has evolved over time. Since its
introduction, more than 16,000 commits have accumulated
in the repository, with detailed timestamps, author informa-
tion, and commit messages, providing a valuable source of
information for understanding SEAndroid.
3.1 The “box” metric
One might wonder whether the complexity of a policy
snapshot could simply be measured by counting the number
of rules. However, this is not enough due to the abstraction
features, such as macros, groups, and wildcards, that are
heavily used throughout the policy base. To address this,
we have designed a new metric, the “box”, which is similar
in spirit to Lampson’s term “attribute” in his original work
on access control matrices [22]. At a high level, a box is a
quadruple with one subject type, one object type, one class,
and one permission. This is the atomic unit that we use
to quantify the complexity. With this, we can look at two
interesting metrics: how many rules target each box, as well
as how many boxes are targeted by each rule.
From rules to boxes. In order to obtain the boxes,
we decompose each rule in the policy base in the follow-
ing way. First, we expand all the macros used in the pol-
icy rules, and obtain all the classes and permissions from
the access vectors file. We then scan all the policy
files and obtain all attributes and types. After this, we per-
form a second pass over all the policy files and decom-
pose each allow and neverallow rule to their respec-
tive boxes, using the subject, object, class, and permission
fields in each rule. A single allow rule may be decomposed
into many allow boxes; neverallow rules are decom-
posed as “negative” boxes which are then subtracted from
the allow boxes. The final outcome is a list of allow
boxes equivalent to the original policy.
3.2 Git repository analysis
We repeat this analysis using boxes for each snapshot
contained in the Git history. A Git history is a directed
acyclic graph (DAG), where the commits are vertices and
parent-child relations are edges. Because Git supports mul-
tiple branches which might then merge, not every pair of Git
commits is necessarily going to have an ancestor-descent
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relationship. By analyzing the graph along with the con-
tents of each vertex, we would be able to understand how
the policy evolved over time. In addition to analyzing the
source code “diff” in each commit, a commit also has var-
ious types of metadata, such as the committer’s timestamp,
email address, and comments. Such information allows us
to gain further understanding of the rationale behind each
policy change. Last but not least, based on the timestamps
of the Git commits, we can also associate these changes to
important historical events, such as security breaches.
One complication that arises due to the nature of Git is
the large number of branches, as it is a distributed source
code management system with many contributors. A con-
tributor can create new branches any time without commu-
nicating with the master branch, and merge these branches
back. Consequently, if we looked only at the timestamp
of each commit and ordered every commit by these times-
tamps, we would be looking at multiple interleaved his-
tories. Git also supports a “rebase” feature that allows
separate branches to be rearranged into single linear time-
line, albeit with the original timestamps, although multi-
ple changes can also be “squashed” post-facto into a single
commit event. Suffice to say that our view of the Git repos-
itory, as it’s delivered to us, certainly represents the evolu-
tion of the SEAndroid policy over time, but it’s possible that
we’re not seeing important parts of the history.
To simplify our analysis, we decided to perform our mea-
surement study on the master branch only. Although look-
ing at other branches may give additional information, we
believe that an analysis of the master branch is a useful start-
ing point, because the master branch reflects the history of
Android as it was shipped from Google through AOSP to
the Android OEMs.
3.3 Our measurement tool
We build our measurement tool in Python using 2,000
lines of code, with three components. Our crawler uses
standard Git commands to check out the repository snap-
shots, our parser generates the box metrics from rules, and
our serializer uses Python’s msgpack library to store the
policy to the disk.
On our experiment platform, an Intel Core i7 computer
with 4 cores and 32 GB RAM and a 4 TB hard disk, our tool
takes several seconds per policy snapshot, parsing all rules
and generating boxes from the rules. For all commits from
January 2012 to August 2018, our tool generates 3 TB of
raw data, with hundreds of thousands of boxes per commit.
Constructing the full database takes more than 90 hours of
processing.
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Figure 3. The number of rules vs. the number
of boxes.
4 Measurement Results
In this section and the next, we present the measurement
results obtained from 16,100 commits to the SEAndroid
policy repository between January 2012 and August 2018.
We focus on the results obtained using the new box metric
in this section, and provide a broader, historical analysis in
the next section.
4.1 Boxes vs. rules
Figure 3 shows two time series of the number of rules
versus the number of boxes in each commit. We can see
that, except for the period of time between mid-2013 and
mid-2015, the curves are increasing roughly exponentially
(note that the Y-axis is in logarithmic scale).
Zooming in on the timeline between mid-2013 and mid-
2015, we can see many fluctuations in both curves. We have
in particular identified two events that we marked as “A” and
“B”. In the “A” commit, authored by a Google engineer, the
number of rules suddenly dropped from 1,000 to 200; but
the number of boxes jumped from 214,000 to 2,315,000, an
increase of more than 10×. We have manually analyzed this
commit, as well as the differences from the previous com-
mit, and found that this new commit associated all types to a
single domain—unconfineddomain. This new domain
allowed virtually any access to any object, and removed
all other individual access rules with the same subjects and
objects, which represents a clear break from past practice.
Interestingly, we found that this “unconfined domain” was
present even in the original version authored by NSA; but
at that time, it was intended for some special entities that
should bypass all security enforcement, and nothing was as-
sociated with it.
So what was Google trying to accomplish with this one
commit? Here is the original commit message:
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Make all domains unconfined.
This prevents denials from being
generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be
incrementally tightened to improve
security.
We are not able to find any external documentation for this
drastic decision, but we could draw inferences about what
problems they may have been facing. In 2012, Android
passed iOS in market share [30], having roughly double the
market share of iOS in 2013. Such drastic growth and in-
tense competition may have created pressures to ship code
on time, with security necessarily a lower priority. As the
commit text suggests, Google had long-term plans for im-
proving its use of SEAndroid, but for now wasn’t planning
on using it for anything beyond the benefit of having it in-
tegrated at all, allowing OEMs to begin experimenting with
SEAndroid security policies.
Indeed, Google did fix it later. The “B” arrows indicate
changes to the SEAndroid policy that drastically shrank the
size of the “unconfined domain”, and the general downward
slope of the number of boxes during this time period shows
a diligent effort over 1.5 years to ultimately eliminate the
unconfined domain from the SEAndroid policy. By the An-
droid 6.0 release, the unconfined domain was no longer in
use.
We note the disconnect between the number of rules and
the number of boxes. Each of the “B” arrows shows a signif-
icant reduction in the number of boxes, yet there is no cor-
responding change in the number of rules. This suggests an
engineering process of methodically adding focused rules to
cover the needs of various applications that were previously
satisfied by the unconfined domain. After policy testing,
large chunks of the unconfined domain could be unneces-
sary and therefore removed. We see this in several large
downward steps in the number of boxes, as well as in the
broader downward slope during this time period.
As of 2018, Android is even bigger than before, there
are more participants than before, and the policy is no more
changing rapidly, so we do not expect that a similar event is
happening, but this is a great example for us to suggest we
need proper metrics on the policy configuration as well as
the documentation.
Takeaway #1: Such results illustrate the importance of con-
sidering rules and boxes as distinct metrics of policy com-
plexity. Even though in more recent years we see the rules
and boxes growing side by side, there is demonstrably no
necessity that there be a linear relationship between rules
and boxes.
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4.2 Number of boxes in a rule
As we noted earlier, the number of boxes or rules, by
themselves, do not necessarily tell a complete story about
the complexity of a given security policy. We next look at
the number of boxes per rule, which measures the complex-
ity due to the use of macros and other grouping features of
SELinux security policies.
Figure 4 shows these ratios as of each major Android
release from Android 4.3 through 9.0. We then group the
results into frequency buckets on a logarithmic scale, so “<
101” counts the number of rules that touch 2 − 9 boxes,
and “< 102” counts the number of rules that touch 10− 99
boxes. From this, we can see that we have similar numbers
of rules that touch a single box as we have rules that touch
10−99 boxes, with some falloff once we consider rules that
impact 100 or more boxes.
For each frequency bin, we see an upward slope from
Android 4.3 through to 8.0. Keep in mind that the y-axis
is log-scaled, so these represent an exponentially growing
number of rules in each bin, which is consistent with our
earlier measurements in Figure 3.
There is an interesting data point in Figure 4. In Android
9.0, the bin 10000−99999 has grown from 1 to 5. The four
new rules are:
allow domain dev_type:lnk_file r_file_perms;
get_prop(domain, core_property_type)
allow domain fs_type:dir getattr;
allow domain fs_type:filesystem getattr;
These four rules allow the attribute domain, which in-
cludes virtually every subject, to read all “link files” (i.e.,
symbolic links), to invoke the stat() system call on vir-
tually every file and directories in the system, and to access
all the “core properties” (i.e., configuration values similar
to the registry in Microsoft Windows). In addition, even
though there are only five rules in this bin, they impact
more than 110, 000 boxes. Therefore, if there is ever a need
to deny the stat() call for a few specific processes, one
would need to carve out additional rules from these generic
6
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rules, e.g., by creating certain negative rules or splitting
these generic rules into smaller, more specific ones.
Lastly, we present the “average” number of boxes per
rule across each Android security policy snapshot. We see a
spike in Android 4.4, which is likely caused by the massive
“unconfined” domain issue. It then drops for 5.0, and be-
comes relatively stable from 6.0 through 9.0. This suggests
that Android team has achieved a stable engineering disci-
pline, in the sense that while the absolute number of boxes is
growing exponentially, the effort per box to construct suit-
able policies is roughly constant across these three releases.
Takeaway #2: Some small number of rules could touch a
large number of boxes due to the abstraction features. Over-
all, the number of boxes touched by a rule increased over
time, but this ratio seems to be stabilizing, despite the con-
tinued exponential growth in the absolute number of rules
and boxes.
4.3 Number of rules per box
As before, we define a box to be an atomic access control
unit. Our next concern is that multiple rules might speak
about the same box. Why is it bad to have multiple rules
influencing the same box? Consider the case of a security
engineer, auditing the security policy, who determines that
one of the rules is over-broad and thus requires some effort
to fix the problem. If our engineer didn’t realize that multi-
ple rules allowed the same box, then this engineering effort
might not have its desired impact. Where a high ratio of
“boxes per rule” indicates the use of macros and grouping
features, a high ratio of “rules per box” instead indicates a
degree of imprecision in the design of the rules.
Figure 5 shows the rules per box for seven different com-
mits at dates selected across the range of Android. Since
it is natural that one box should be derived from the only
one rule, we do not collect these cases. As we see from the
graph, there are a large number of boxes derived from 2 or 3
rules for all the sampled commits. More importantly, there
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is a trend that the tail (i.e., boxes with ten or more rules that
specify them) is growing over time. The most popular box,
generated by a remarkable set of 23 rules is:
system_server system_file:dir search;
Some example rules that generate this box include:
allow hal_gnss system_file dir {open... search};
allow hal_power system_file dir {open... search};
allow hal_thermal system_file dir {open... search};
...
HAL, the “hardware abstraction layer,” represents an impor-
tant boundary between the core Android distribution and the
efforts that OEMs make to port Android to their specific de-
vices. These 23 HAL-related rules allow the same box, but
it’s unclear whether this was deliberate or accidental. Cer-
tainly, if a later analysis determines that system server
permissions need to be customized, or that this particular
box needs to be denied, then each of these 23 rules would
need to be changed. Many of these rules say nothing at all
about system server, at least not directly, but they im-
pact it nonetheless.
How did this happen? This is a consequence of the
overlapping rules in HAL-related macro functions and at-
tributes, where macros sometimes even expand into other
macros. The HAL subsystem would benefit from some
degree of refactoring to simplify its security policies, re-
designing it to avoid so much overlap.
Takeaway #3: Most boxes only have a small number of
rules, but a few boxes contain more than ten rules, which
could be an obstacle for effective policy maintenance.
4.4 Ratio of rule vs. box changes
To further understand how commits affect the number of
rules and the number of boxes, we plot the ratio ∆B/∆R
for each commit, where ∆B is the number of added boxes,
and ∆R is the number of added rules. If ∆B (or ∆R) is
negative, this means that a commit has reduced the number
of boxes or rules, respectively.
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Figure 6 shows the results starting from July 2015—
we did not present earlier data due to the use of
unconfineddomain. The average ratio is 120, meaning
that the “box” metric is more sensitive to changes. More-
over, we observed negative ratios, which means that the
number of rules has increased (or decreased) while the num-
ber of boxes has decreased (or increased)—further evidence
that their relation is non-linear.
For the peak indicated by A, the ratio is larger than
35, 000. We found that this is because Google added a new
file type called vendor file type, and added file-related
rules to the domain subject, which includes virtually all
processes. Another peak, as indicated by B, has not affected
the number of rules much; rather, a new permission map is
added to existing rules. For instance, a rule
allow domain system_file: file {execute read open};
would become the following:
allow domain system_file: file {execute read open map};
Takeaway #4: A change in the number of rules may not
always lead to a corresponding change in the number of
boxes.
4.5 Summary
To summarize, the box and rule metrics have an inter-
esting and non-linear relationship; used in combination,
anomalies and large changes directly point to interesting
and relevant engineering changes in Android’s history, such
as the introduction and eventual elimination of Android’s
use of unconfineddomain.
By expanding rules to boxes, we gain an instrument
that is very sensitive to policy changes. Even though the
written rule changes might be small, the box changes can
be enormous. This allows us to focus our attention on
both local discontinuities, which point to specific signifi-
cant patches made to the SEAndroid policy, as well as the
broader multi-year trends in SEAndroid engineering. With
our work, Google and OEMs could institute security policy
metrics for SEAndroid. Our policy metrics could prove use-
ful alongside other traditional software engineering metrics
(e.g., lines of code, or bugs filed and fixed) to help Android
project managers quantify the evolving complexity of their
system. Any non-trivial changes in the metrics might imply
significant policy differences, or perhaps even inadvertent
policy misconfigurations.
5 An Historical Analysis
As we mentioned before, the metrics we’ve devised al-
low us to plot long-term patterns of the evolution of the SE-
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Figure 7. Cumulative distribution of the age
of types.
Android security policy. With these metrics, and the atten-
dant timestamps, we can examine a number of other trends
over time.
5.1 The “age” of rules
To start, we want a metric that speaks to the degree of
turnover of the rules in SELinux policies. We can derive
a given rule’s “age” by identifying the Git commit when
it was most recently changed. The longer a rule has been
unchanged, the older it must be. Rather than using wall-
clock timestamps, we instead use the order of the commits.
This means that, as the rate of commits has increased in
recent years, our age metric will “speed up” to reflect the
increased degree of activity.
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) show the cumulative distribution
function diagrams of the age of each SEAndroid subject and
object, respectively, across all commits on the master AOSP
branch. The x-axis is the age of the type, and the y-axis is
the cumulative distribution. This means that the types on
the left side of the CDF are older, and types on the right
side are more recent. The arrows “A” and “E” indicate the
“oldest” subjects and objectives, respectively, which were
created at the very beginning of the policy by NSA; they
account for 20% of all the current types. The arrows “C”
and “G” indicate the introduction of the types for the hard-
ware abstraction layer (“HAL”) subsystem (e.g., hal audio
default and hal drm default). These types were introduced
in a single commit by Google in October 2016.
At arrow “B”, the types of system properties were sep-
arated into multiple types such as audio prop and blue-
tooth prop. Before this commit, all the properties were
associated with a single type, system prop. This was pre-
sumably part of a privilege separation engineering push
within Android. Perhaps as part of the same effort, at ar-
row “F”, all the system services were separated into mul-
tiple types such as alarm service and cpuinfo service. Be-
fore this commit, all the system services were assigned to a
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Figure 8. Fitted curves for types, rules, and
boxes.
single type, system service. In this commit, a new attribute
temp system server service was added and all the separated
services were associated with the new attribute; they inher-
ited all the rules for the existing system service type. The
temp system server service attribute later disappeared, per-
haps unsurprisingly, given it is a “temporary” name.
At arrow “H”, a number of HAL related types were
added in a single commit. In this case, the new types were
related to a new HAL service which is now part of the ver-
sion 8.0. Regions near arrows “D” and “I” indicate a radi-
cal increase of the types for Android, which are all part of
the version 8.0 or later such as lowPAN (low-power wire-
less personal area network) for Android IoT devices and
exported property feature for debugging annotations.
All of the commits at these labeled arrows after the initial
NSA version were authored by Google. This suggests that
other vendors are making only minor updates and tweaks, at
least as far as their contributions to Android AOSP are con-
cerned; large-scale engineering shifts are only happening at
Google. We discuss more about different vendor contribu-
tions in Section 5.5.
Takeaway #5: A non-trivial portion of the rules were
present since the beginning, although the majority of the
rules have gone through changes. Major events tend to af-
fect a large number of rules, showing up as jump points in
the curve.
5.2 The increasing policy complexity
As shown in Figures 3 and 7, the complexity of the pol-
icy is exponentially increasing over time. Since the com-
plexity is directly related to its maintainability, we would
like to evaluate and estimate the growth pattern in more de-
tail.
Figure 8 shows the linear scale fitted curves of three
important indicators for policy complexity, which are the
number of types, rules, and boxes. We generated this fig-
ure partly by extrapolating the future complexity increase
based on the current change trends. For instance, extrapo-
lating from the growth, the number of types and the number
of rules might double from today (mid-2018) to mid-2020.
However, the fitted curve of the number of the boxes is
different. As shown in Figure 8(c), we fit different segments
of the graph with three different curves having different ex-
ponents. Not only is the number of boxes growing, the ex-
ponent of growth is growing! Super-exponential growth of
our security policies cannot be a desirable attribute.
In Figure 8(c), we sampled important points after the
“unconfined domain” period, which is separated to 3
different curves with different exponents and constants, be-
cause there are multiple jumps in the original curve due to
the addition of new types, rules, and macros in every ver-
sion release. For example, a big jump happened in 2017,
due to the addition of HAL layer, as shown in Figure 7. The
slopes of the fitted lines of all those three different curves
are radically increasing.
This is a very important indication of the complexity
increase—the exponent seems to be increasing, which sug-
gests that the policy maintainability is getting more chal-
lenging as time goes on. Since there is virtually no mainte-
nance manual or any public documentation about the policy,
the device manufacturers, who need to customize the pol-
icy for their products, would face an enormous obstacle in
terms of maintainability and evaluability for their product
releases. Even if major contributors such as Google have
consistently maintained internal documents, the trend still
indicates that their maintainability is likely to get more dif-
ficult over time.
Takeaway #6: The complexity of the SEAndroid policy is
increasingly super-exponentially, which complicates main-
tainability and analysis.
5.3 The effect of multiple branches
Git is a distributed source-code management system, al-
lowing separate organizations to maintain separate reposito-
ries with separate histories, merging those histories when-
ever they want. This has the curious property that the ver-
sion of history that we see will change over time as al-
ternative histories are merged or rebased into the main-
line history. Among other issues, if two different branches
are merged into one, we cannot distinguish which was the
master and which was the merged branch without prior
information; instead, we only can see that two branches
merged. This means that tracking the “real” history of An-
droid AOSP would require us to maintain snapshots of the
entire Git repository’s state, taken over time, rather than just
examining the newest repository for its historical commits;
this issue has been pointed out before by Bird et al. [5] as
one of the potential downsides of Git mining and analysis.
However, capturing all Git histories, continuously, is infea-
sible. To at least understand the impact of these issues, we
analyzed our snapshot of the Android repository before and
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Figure 9. Comparison of the number of types
in same period of time captured in different
time
after the “Oreo” Android releases in August 2017, where
we observed more than 1,500 commits added in the span of
a few days.
Figure 9 shows the two different curves with the number
of SEAndroid types for the same period of time from Jan-
uary 2017 to May 2017, but reflecting the “pre-Oreo” and
“post-Oreo” repository states. In Figure 9(a), we plot the
“pre-Oreo” (late “Nougat”) data from the end May 2017; in
Figure 9(b), we plot the same time period from the AOSP
repository as of September 2017. These two curves show
the same upward trends but Figure 9(b) shows significantly
more noise. This is the result of a merge in the repository,
performed at the end of July, with the merged commits orig-
inally committed in early 2017; these new commits only
appeared on the master branch after the “Oreo” release, de-
spite predating it. Since the graph uses the commit time as
its x-axis, it shows fluctuations between the pre- and post-
Oreo branch merger. Needless to say, branch merge events
add additional complexity and noise to our data.
Most of the time-series graphs we derived in this paper
have a similar square-shaped noise, likely due to merged
branches. Because we cannot track private branches prior to
their merger, it is not possible to distinguish which stream of
the commit was the mainstream of the master branch before
the merge. The timestamps are all we have, and thus we’re
stuck looking at interleaved time-series data, and thus the
square-shaped noise. We can at least visually interpret the
tops and bottoms of the square-shapes as representing the
two original pre-merger commit streams.
This pattern shows that Google is continuing to de-
velop Android internally, with mergers into the publicly
visible AOSP only happening on major releases. While
Android OEMs will hopefully have a more granular view
of Google’s efforts, any external developer trying to work
with the SEAndroid security policy will observe these gi-
ant shifts and will have to debug and merge their changes
with every Android release. Even for an Android OEM,
Google’s large changes presumably make it difficult for
vendors to deviate from AOSP’s SEAndroid policies in any
meaningful way, as they would still have to rebase and/or
merge their changes. For example, as we can see from the
arrows in Figure 7, a single commit could introduce many
new types, which would represent a significant integration
challenge for an OEM trying to maintain a custom policy.
Takeaway #7: The existence of multiple Git branches and
merges introduce significant measurement challenges, as
well as significantly impacting any third-party attempt to
do their own work in SEAndroid.
5.4 Case study: Stagefright
We now turn to examine a newsworthy security event in
Android’s history and see if we can observe evidence in the
evolution of the SEAndroid policy to respond to it.
To select the most suitable security events, we looked at
234 high-scoring Android CVEs in a third-party study [53].
128 of them are related to hardware and driver issues, which
are beyond the scope of SEAndroid. Next up are 62 vul-
nerabilities with the media framework. There are also 22
Adobe Flash vulnerabilities, but we cannot observe any ar-
tifacts of these in the SEAndroid policy, as Flash is not part
of AOSP. Therefore, media framework vulnerabilities seem
like a good place for a case study. The most widely publi-
cized security event in the media framework, in particular,
was the “Stagefright” vulnerability.
Stagefright was found and reported to Google by secu-
rity researcher Joshua Drake in April 2015 [52]. Google
shared the issue with device manufacturers in May 2015,
and the vulnerability was publicly disclosed in August of
that year. This vulnerability is a simple integer overflow
bug in the libstageflight library which is used by the
media framework. The attacker can inject carefully crafted
malicious code, in a media file, via any application which
uses Android’s media API, allowing the attacker to have ar-
bitrary malicious code execution in a context with elevated
security privileges relative to any regular user-installed An-
droid application. Google patched the integer overflow bug
and distributed the patch in May 2015.
Figure 10 shows the number of the boxes and the num-
ber of the rules, in log scale, with media-related subjects and
objects from January 2015 to September 2017. Red vertical
bars indicate significant events in the history of the Stage-
fright vulnerability. The SEAndroid policy did not change
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much during the initial period when the vulnerability was
discovered, patched, and the fix was distributed. However,
both the number of boxes and the number of the rules dra-
matically increased in early 2016, shown at arrow “A”. This
was a result of separating the media server into multiple dis-
tinct services [10] such as mediaextractor, camera server,
mediadrm server, and mediacodecservice, each with more
limited privileges than the original monolithic service. Of
note, all the media related services lost the permissions to
write a normal file. Additionally, they lost the memexec per-
mission.
Another jump, shown at arrow “B”, is related to the ad-
dition of rules related to a new audio server service. While
the number of rules changed was small, the number of boxes
changed was much larger, indicating the importance and
reach of the changes.
Takeaway #8: SEAndroid policies are an essential mech-
anism for implementing privilege separation, refactoring
monolithic services into smaller cooperating services with
more limited permissions. These policy changes are more
visible in our “box” metrics than when just looking at the
number of rules.
5.5 Contributor comparison
Lastly, we perform a measurement to understand the
composition of contributors to the SEAndroid policy. The
Git history associates an email address with every commit.
Ignoring the username and focusing on the domain name,
we can then associate each commit with the author’s orga-
nization. In Figure 11, we show the number of commits
applied to each major Android release, as authored by each
organization. As might be expected, the vast bulk of the
commits are authored by Google, and Google’s commit fre-
quency is increasing over time, mirroring the exponentially
growing numbers of rule and boxes.
The NSA is the second most frequent committer, with
a spike of commits in the earlier Lollipop release, indicat-
ing some degree of NSA assistance as Google moved away
from the “unconfined” domain design toward a more rigor-
ous security policy.
We also see device and hardware manufacturers (Sam-
sung, Intel, LG, Sony). Each of these vendors maintains its
own private policies that they ship with their own devices. It
is in a manufacturer’s interest to contribute patches back to
Google to avoid too much drift between Google’s codebase
and their own. Samsung stands out, in this regard, for hav-
ing zero visible commits in the latest four versions of An-
droid. (Perhaps Samsung contributed its policies to Google
without sending Git pull requests. If so, a Google engineer
would have merged their changes by hand, and the resulting
commits would appear with a Google email address.)
The remaining organizations, Tresys, Linaro, and Mitre,
represent two commercial consultancies and a Federally
Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) that
works extensively with the U.S. government. Tresys no-
tably offers SELinux policy customization as a service for
paying customers [46].
Takeaway #9: Even though there are a number of non-
Google contributors, most of their commits are simply fix-
ing typos or adding missing simple rules which imply that
only Google is leading the project. In addition, all the im-
portant policy changes such as all the arrow marks in Fig-
ures 3 and 7 are authored only by Google.
6 Discussion
Next, we discuss three items related to our measurement
study: the Tizen system, the new Android Treble release,
and Android for Work.
6.1 SEAndroid vs. Smack
As we have seen, the SEAndroid policy is getting more
complex over time. Sophisticated policies may promise
11
better security, but they also make it challenging to rea-
son about the configuration, allowing innocent mistakes to
creep into the design.
As a point of contrast, Tizen [28] uses a very different
approach. Just like Android, Tizen is a Linux-based operat-
ing system targeted for mobile devices, and it uses a similar
access control mechanism to SEAndroid called Smack [40].
The biggest difference is that Tizen doesn’t overload Unix
user IDs to separate applications from one another. Instead,
all the apps for the same user use the same Unix user ID,
but with Smack labels to isolate the applications.
We performed a small-scale experiment by counting the
number of Smack rules in Tizen from its Git repository, and
Figure 12 shows the result. We have removed the Smack
rules related to specific applications to make a fair compar-
ison with SEAndroid. We can see that the number of rules
fluctuates across versions, but it stabilizes at roughly 2,000
in Tizen 3.0, which is radically smaller than the number of
rules in SEAndroid.
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releases
In Tizen 2.x, Smack is used for all the access control
mechanisms including application isolation and API per-
missions, with the number of rules tightly related to the
number of features. Consequently, the policy complexity
is relatively high. The decrease in 2.3.1 and increase in
2.4 in Figure 12 is simply due to the removal and addition
of many OS features [25]. Tizen 3.0 [26] featured a com-
plete redesign of the Smack policy, providing only a mini-
mal privilege separation for the system resources and each
application [24]: Unix user IDs and Linux namespaces are
used to isolate system services, and a new module called
Cynara [23] was added to manage per-app API permissions
(i.e., as in Android, users’ grants of specific permissions to
Tizen apps is no longer managed by the underlying Smack
system but is instead managed in a separate system). The
number of the rules in Tizen 3.0 and Tizen 4.0 is exactly the
same: 2,134 rules, despite the otherwise significant changes
between the two major releases, including support for IoT
devices, and coding in C#/.NET [27].
Although there is no “correct” approach to access con-
trol configuration, and we take no position on whether Ti-
zen is fundamentally more or less secure than Android, Ti-
zen demonstrates that MAC policies can be deployed with-
out the staggering complexity of modern SEAndroid poli-
cies. Of course, the very lack of fine-grained permissions
expressed in Tizen could as much represent the benefits of
simplicity as the pitfalls of over-simplification. Regardless,
the fact that both Android and Tizen are attempting to solve
quite similar problems in radically different ways suggests
that there may be lessons to draw from each to the benefit
of the other.
6.2 Android Treble
In Android 8.0, Google introduced Treble [11] as a
framework to separate platform and manufacturer features.
Treble’s main goal is to make it easier for Google to ship
updated Android systems by creating a stable abstraction
boundary between vendor features and the Android distri-
butions from Google. If done properly, we should see a
higher fraction of Android devices running recent releases
of Android, improving security for Android users and sim-
plifying the release engineering process for Android OEMs.
While a full summary of Treble is beyond the scope of
this paper, Treble does have an impact on SEAndroid. In
prior releases, Android vendors would start with Google’s
AOSP SEAndroid policy and make suitable modifications
to support device-specific features, perhaps porting changes
forward from release to release. Treble separates “vendor
policies” from Google’s own system policy. Both policies
are separately compiled to a new common intermediate lan-
guage (CIL), and are then combined into a single policy as
part of the boot process. This allows Google to update its
SEAndroid policy without vendor intervention.
The AOSP version of the SEAndroid policy is effec-
tively the same as before, so it doesn’t impact the continu-
ing growth of SEAndroid policy complexity over time. But,
now that vendor policies will be separated out, as more ven-
dors ship devices with Android 8.0 or later, follow-on re-
search to this paper will be able to look at vendor-specific
firmware images as opposed to AOSP releases, and such fu-
ture work will be able to make interesting comparisons be-
tween vendors. Some vendors will inevitably make huge
changes while others change little or nothing. And, in-
evitably, some vendors will introduce security flaws by en-
abling too many permissions. Also, the new CIL format
retains some macro and grouping structures, allowing it to
be far more amenable to analysis than the compiled binary
policies of earlier Android releases, where macros have
been completely expanded.
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6.3 Android for Work
Android for Work is an enterprise security solution for
“Bring-Your-Own-Device” (BYOD) environment, which
was introduced in Android 5 and is still under active devel-
opment. Android for Work supports separated runtime en-
vironments between work applications and personal appli-
cations. This requires extensive resource isolation, access
control, and policy configuration. Knox, a similar BYOD
solution introduced by Samsung [37], also used SELinux
policies to support such access control. Android for Work
would certainly be amenable for the same sort of analysis
that we did in this paper, but the source code for it is not
made available as part of AOSP. If it does become available
in the future, its evolution over time would be an interest-
ing subject to study, particularly as the Android for Work
developers must necessarily respond to and integrate with
changes in the larger SEAndroid policy.
7 Related work
Our work is most related to two lines of existing
work: analyses of SEAndroid/SELinux policies, and gen-
eral software-engineering analyses of Git repositories.
SEAndroid/SELinux policy analysis. Understanding soft-
ware complexity is an important topic in the software en-
gineering community, and a variety of useful metrics have
been proposed over the years, such as cyclomatic complex-
ity [31] and Halstead volume [32]. However, in the con-
text of SEAndroid/SELinux policy, complexity measure-
ments are much less studied; the dominant metric is simply
the number of rules in the policy source code [36]. Re-
searchers have also used formal verification on SELinux
policies [14, 18, 38, 17, 2, 39], artificial intelligence, infor-
mation flow integrity measurement [16, 15, 48], and func-
tional tests [49]. Even machine learning techniques have
been used to analyze policies based on SELinux denial logs
from billions of devices [50].
Chen et al. [6] study the SEAndroid policy with the goal
of identifying potential misconfigurations. They combine
the SEAndroid mandatory policies with the discretionary
policies embedded in the Android file system (i.e., Unix
permission bits), giving them a more complete look at what
is actually allowed or denied in practice. Both their work
and ours present metrics and tools that might be useful in the
Android development process. One important difference,
however, is that we focus on quantifying the complexity of
a policy snapshot, and on how the complexity evolves over
time.
Git mining. Bird et al. [5] provide a comprehensive anal-
ysis on the pros and cons of Git mining [5]. Notably,
one of the challenges they mention is the lack of a main-
line repository when dealing with multiple Git branches.
Many other researchers have studied Git repositories (see,
e.g., [44, 47, 13]). Negara et al. [33] use Git mining to detect
patterns of code changes [33], German et al. [9] and Jiang et
al. [20] analyze Linux kernel repositories’ code over time.
In our work, we apply similar concepts toward the study of
SEAndroid’s evolution.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have performed the first historical anal-
ysis of the SEAndroid policy to understand its evolution
over time. We looked at both “rules” as written in the SEAn-
droid policy and the “boxes” those rules expanded to after
processing all the macro and grouping operators. By plot-
ting these metrics over time, we can observe the exponen-
tial growth in the complexity of SEAndroid policies, which
will inevitably hit a brick wall of engineering complexity
and require new and novel approaches to manage this com-
plexity. Such approaches might lean on techniques from
across many fields of computer science. For instance, we
could utilize neverallow box as a policy “coverage” met-
ric. Neverallow rules are used as assertion tools that policy
engineer defines the boxes which should never be allowed,
but as of November 2018, only 3% of the possible boxes
are covered by allow and neverallow boxes. Therefore, we
could increase the coverage by measuring the current status
and enhancing the number of the neverallow boxes.
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